A defense of Foundationalism against Laurence Bonjour
Thesis:
Laurence Bonjour’s argument that Foundationalism fails to answer the regress problem with empirical justification fails because the requirement for justification that he requires is impossible to attain.
Exposition:
Laurence Bonjour’s paper Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation? is a lengthy prose into the classic skeptical problems with knowledge and the various alternatives given over the years. In particular, he focuses on what he calls the untenable position of Foundationalism. In the body of his paper, Bonjour argues that Foundationalism fails to sufficiently answer the regress problem on empirical grounds. In order to prove this, Bonjour defines not only the nature of the infinite regress, but also two specific responses potentially given by a foundationalist to the immediate dispute over their claim to knowledge. However, in order to understand his claim against Foundationalism, Bonjour begins by defining the nature of the infinite regress.
The regress problem has to do with one of the fundamental issues surrounding epistemology: how can someone have knowledge? In philosophy, knowledge comes from a justified true belief. In other words, when someone has philosophic knowledge, she has a belief backed by some form of real-world justification. However, the common skeptical response is that this justification for a belief requires some further justification in order to believe its truth. Justification in this sense is reliable to the philosopher only because it is supported by said additional belief. For example, in order to support a theory of guilt in court, a lawyer must produce evidence to support his claim. In order to support the theory of his guilt, the prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson trial produced the evidence of a bloody glove that allegedly belonged to Mr. Simpson. The problem with supporting evidence is that it relies on further evidence to prove its legitimacy. Secondary support backfired for the prosecution in this case when they had Simpson try on the glove in front of the jury. When the glove didn’t fit, the secondary evidence (belief that the glove was his) was proven dubious and the primary evidence was put into jeopardy. The fragility between belief and justification is highlighted here. In order for a belief to lead to knowledge, it must have justification. Unfortunately, this justification requires belief in further justification. This chain of evidentiary support can continue indefinitely. This is the nature of the epistemic regress. The breadth and depth of such a regress is potentially infinite and, as Bonjour states: “vicious”.
Bonjour applies such a level of brutality to the regress for good reason. The very nature of the regress does not allow for any knowledge to be had at all. If belief and justification are constantly chasing each other down the rabbit hole, then justification can never truly begin. Without justification, there can be no knowledge. Such a skeptical response to knowledge is difficult to overcome. It’s an issue that Bonjour claims can only allow for four possibilities. The first is that the regress might terminate with beliefs for which no justification of any kind is available. This alternative fails the Kantian test of conception almost immediately. Let’s assume there is a single belief which requires no justification. All beliefs being equal in conception, this would mean all other beliefs would require no justification, either. Thus, the entire linear system of belief leads to justification becoming arbitrary. The second option is that the regress might proceed infinitely backwards with ever more new beliefs being introduced, themselves requiring justification. This option fails because it is simply repeating the original skeptical regress problem. Each belief would lead to a justification, ad infinitum. The only possible defense of this option, submitted by Bonjour, is to say that the regress is not vicious. Instead, we are simply incapable of conceiving of, or retaining the infinite number of distinct beliefs required for this view. In this case, there can be no true ordinary knower. The third possibility is that the regress might circle back upon itself. This alternative is, prima facie, one of the worst alternatives for Bonjour. After all, such an alternative is circular in nature and never allows for true justification to be had. In this case, the justifications must be justified before they can be justified. Thus, a paradox. However, Bonjour claims that such a system forgoes the linear nature of justification. Individual beliefs in a chain are replaced with a closed system of beliefs, each in support of one another creating a coherent whole. Such a system is not immune to its own string of skeptical problems, however. So, Bonjour sets this alternative to the side with the other two in light of the last option. The fourth possibility in response to the infinite regress, as presented by Bonjour, is that the regress might terminate because beliefs are reached which are justified but whose justification does not depend inferentially on other empirical beliefs. This alternative is similar to the first in that the regress is ended at a certain point of belief. However, this alternative requires the first (“basic”) belief to retain some sort of justification, but not one inferred by further belief. This is the core of Foundationalism.
For Bonjour, Foundationalism is the strongest answer to the skeptical regress problem presented by epistemic knowledge. It says there are beliefs which are justified, but those justifications require no further beliefs. These basic beliefs require no inference on any other belief in order to provide solid justification for a belief. As such, they are individually suitable to warrant justification and stop the infinite regress in its tracks. However, almost immediately Bonjour sees a problem with epistemic beliefs which require no empirical justification.
Bonjour’s attack on Foundationalism is centered on the concept of basic beliefs. His claim is that there is no way to provide proper non-inferential justification from an empirical perspective. He uses the theological analogy of the un-moved mover. He claims that it is impossible for a belief to impart motion (justification) on other beliefs without being in motion itself. Alternatively, Bonjour queries how a belief might impart “motion” on itself. This points back to the second response to the regress problem mentioned earlier; a belief is always being backed by another belief, creating an infinite chain of epistemic justification. Bonjour admits to forms of external justification for a belief: moral, practical, theological, etc. However, he sets up the requirement for true justification as one of epistemic value. He defines this form of justification as one that is related to the “cognitive goal of truth.” What he means by this is, the goal of providing this justification, is to pursue epistemic truth. Justification can be provided by moral standards or theological dogma, but true justification (for Bonjour) is provided by correlation with external truth. In order for justification to provide basic qualification, it must also be given a good reason for thinking the belief is true. Bonjour says: “it is hard to see how a particular empirical belief could be justified on a purely a priori basis.” In essence, he requires that, for a belief to be empirically true, it must exist prior to experience.
Bonjour gives the following argument against basic beliefs. If a belief is basic, non-inferential based on any other belief, then the feature which qualifies a belief as being basic must also be a good reason for believing it is true. In other words, there must be something (x) about a belief which makes it non-inferential. This feature (x) is also the reason to believe that the belief is epistemically true. He gives something similar to the following example:
1. Belief B has feature x.
2. Beliefs having feature x are highly likely to be true.
3. Therefore, B is highly likely to be true.
The problem that arises for Bonjour here is that B is still reliant on some further evidence (x) in order to be justified. Thus, it cannot be a basic belief.
Bonjour claims there are two possible responses to this problem with basic beliefs as long as the strong foundationalist remains within the confines of the traditional conception of knowledge, avoids embracing skepticism, and does not attempt to argue that an empirical belief could be justified on a purely a priori basis. On one hand, a foundationalist can point to the connection between her belief and empirical fact without knowing what that fact is exactly. The other possible response is similar to the first. However, in this case, the person would have a basic belief and knowledge of the external truth to which it correlates, but not necessarily how the two connect.
The first response, Bonjour refers to as “externalism”. He says that it is not always necessary that the person for whom the belief is basic know or even justifiably believe that it is available; instead, in the case of basic beliefs, it is sufficient that the premises for an argument of that general sort merely be true, whether or not that person justifiably believes that they are true. There simply must be a law like connection between the believer’s concept and the real world, whether or not she actually knows about it. The person merely needs to believe that her belief obtains to an epistemic state of affairs. An omnipotent observer could not only see the causal connection between the person’s belief and the justification for it, but the observer would herself believe in the connection.
Bonjour calls this an ad hoc solution to the regress problem. He argues that this approach avoids the regress problem in certain situations by claiming it doesn’t apply to certain beliefs. This is avoided by the justification being external and unknown to the believer. However, the point of the regress is that the believer knows not only her belief, but also the justification for it (if it exists). A superficially alternative version of externalism claims that the believer is aware of both her belief and the connection to some external justification. However, the connection is not required to be justified. Bonjour equates this to reading tea leaves or astrological charts.
The other potential response that Bonjour postulates is what he refers to as givenism. This is, as Bonjour claims, the standard foundationalist solution to this particular attack. The argument here is similar to externalism in that basic beliefs are justified by external epistemic circumstances. However, a givenist is aware of the external state of affairs which her belief ties into. Bonjour puts the argument in a similar manner to this:
1. If a belief is basic, then it can stop the regress
2. A belief is basic if it requires no further justification
3. For the givenist, basic beliefs are justified by reference to states of affairs in the world
4. These states of affairs are non-cognitive states that are immediately intuited with certainty by the knower
5. The knower can perceive the immediate external world
6. Thus, basic beliefs exist and the regress is ended.
In this case, the states of affairs which justify a basic belief are immediately presented and intuited by the person. In essence, the justification is “given” by objective, observable, external fact.
Bonjour’s response is simple: how? How are these states perceived? How is it possible for a belief to be justified purely on such an inference? Of the authors cited in his paper who support givenism, Bonjour cannot find anyone who explicitly describes the cognitive mechanism in which the intuition between belief and external states of affairs occurs. The nature of givenism is to have a belief which is intuitively justified by given external states. However, wouldn’t that intuition require additional belief in order to be true? This is Bonjour’s argument against givenism. If a given justification is not based on external evidence, then it must be on both the intuition and the justification simultaneously. In a sense, certain cognitive states justify themselves. Bonjour denies this option as a paradox.
For givenism, justification comes from a belief’s connection to a state of affairs in the world. The problem Bonjour presents with this view is why can such an assumption or intuition be made? Why does this intuition itself require no further justification? The intuition in this case would require justification and thus, the regress continues. Externalism and givenism both being equally untenable positions, Bonjour concludes that Foundationalism fails to respond adequately to the skeptical regress problem of knowledge. He also claims that the other immediate response to the regress; coherentism, is equally flawed in its presentation. Thus, Bonjour concludes that we must suspend judgment in light of a lack of adequate answers.
Criticism:
Since writing this paper, Bonjour has abandoned his critique and come out in favor of the Foundationalist view. In the interest of my critique here, however, I will avoid referring to his current perspective in order to leave some semblance of his original argument intact. The main problem with Bonjour’s criticism here is that he sets up a requirement for empirical justification that is impossible to reach.
One of the more well-known critiques of Descartes’ dualism is the alleged “leap” he made from the conceivability of extended body from the mind, to the probability of the extension of the body from the mind. This critique claims that possibility and conceivability are separated by the knowledge of essential properties. For something to exist, it must consist of all its essential properties. Thus, the possibility of something existing is consistent with all of these properties. Conceivability is a cognitive state of imagination, however; this means it is constrained by the properties the conceiver is aware of. Thus, according to this critique, Descartes cannot truly conceive of his extended body if he is unaware of all of its essential properties.
I believe this critique of Descartes to be akin to Bonjour’s critique of Foundationalism. Givenist foundationalists point to basic belief being supported by observable states of affairs in the external world. Bonjour critiques this argument by claiming that the inference of belief from given states of affairs is unexplained and thus, unjustified. In essence, this is a claim that we are unaware of all available properties relating to that intuition and are, therefore, unable to make such an inference.
My evaluation of both critiques is that they are both ridiculous. Like the Descartes critique, Bonjour sets up a requirement for empirical knowledge that is impossible to attain. First, knowledge requires belief and justification. Then, justification requires justification. Then, justification requires a base on which to grow. Basic belief then requires justification in order to be basic. Basic belief is justified by its correlation with real world fact. Then, justification is required for the inference between basic belief and external truth. Assuredly, if Bonjour’s intuitive justification hurdle were traversed and a basic belief were justified a priori, he would subsequently call the intuitive link between that belief and the concept of a priori into question.
Bonjour offers no true critique of Foundationalism. He merely creates a parallel skeptical regress to mirror the one required for knowledge. This is similar to the Cartesian critique in that it requires an impossible amount of justification in order to have knowledge. If you’re going to require adequate knowledge for justification, you’re not going to be able to justify anything.
Let’s revisit Cartesian doubt. Descartes reduced knowledge of the certainty of his existence to his ability to doubt it. This is a perfect example of givenism – justification for the existence of the universe has been reduced to a single basic belief: doubt. However, what is the justification for this belief? How does doubt lead to thinking and thus, the existence of the external world? Doubt is self-justifiable. The answer is briefly glossed over by Bonjour in a single sentence:
“One is reminded here of Chisholm’s claim that certain cognitive states justify themselves, but that extremely paradoxical remark hardly constitutes an explanation of how this is possible.”
Descartes’ ability to doubt is self-justificatory. The malevolent demon is able to deceive me in all possible ways, except for my ability to doubt. The only thing I can know for certain is that it’s possible I know nothing at all. In this case, my belief (that I can doubt) is empirically justified by my cognitive ability to doubt, and “If I have doubt, then I have doubt” is a priori. Therefore, it is possible to have a self-justifying cognitive belief which is justified by its own existence, or a priori. This is a strong foundationalist basic belief in that it requires no other basic beliefs in order to stop the knowledge regress. Therefore, Bonjour’s claim that basic belief cannot be both justified and a priori is false and Foundationalism stands firm.
