Perception is a tricky subject when approached philosophically. But, then again, which subject isn’t? In philosophy, the area concerning external perception specifically is referred to as “perceptual realism”. Within this arena, there are two subgenres of thought: Direct realism and indirect realism. Both acknowledge the existence of an external world and that our senses provide the window into that world. However, both schools of thought differ in how our minds come into contact with it. In this paper, I will explore the nature of these two forms of thought surrounding external perception along with the various challengers and responses.
Direct Realism, also known as “Naïve Realism”, asserts that there is an external world of objects that exist independent of perception. These objects retain their existence and their properties even if they are not being perceived. Specifically, direct realism states that we are in direct perceptual contact with these external objects. As a direct realist, I know that my keyboard is black and smooth to the touch. I know it is black because my eyes can see, by the way the light bounces off of its surface, that the keyboard is black in color. I know it is smooth to the touch because every time my fingers come into contact with a key, it reports back that it is worn down smooth from overuse.
Direct realism is also referred to as “common sense realism” because it accepts prima facie that what is being perceived actually exists external to the mind. However, there are significant challenges to this so-called “naive” approach. The biggest objection to direct realism is in the case of hallucination. In hallucination, the brain creates an internal representation of an external object where one does not exist. However, direct realism does not allow for this kind of discrepancy. This suggests that the mind plays some role in creating awareness of an external object rather than simply perceiving it. This leads us away from direct realism and towards indirect realism.
Indirect realism embraces the idea of these internal objects of awareness. In fact, indirect realism, or “representationalism”, states that we create internal objects of awareness that represent the ideas of the external objects and that is how we perceive the world. In this case, the senses perceive the properties of an external object without coming into contact with it directly. The mind then uses these ideas (or “sense data”) to create an internal representation of the object. An example of this can be found in the Platonic Forms. Plato held that the only way we could have an idea of one of his forms was through an imperfect replication in our world. Indirect realists never come into true contact with the external world. They can only perceive its qualities through sense data. In this way, indirect realists could never have knowledge of the external world, merely a justified belief about it through the evidence of sense data.
Skeptics respond to indirect realism by saying that it can never have a true picture of the world. If the mind can only be fully aware of internal objects, it cannot correlate these objects with the real world truth because it has no independent awareness. Dancy responds to this by pointing to Locke’s perception. Dancy claims that we are simultaneously aware of the idea of an object as well as the object itself. Think of the mirror. We are aware of the properties of an object in the mirror because that’s what we perceive. However, we are also aware of the mirror itself. Thus, we know we’re looking at only the properties of an object, but we also know that said object exists passed the simple reflection. This dual awareness allows the correlation objected to by the representational skeptic.
Indirect and direct realists agree with the notion that the external world exists beyond our minds. Both schools of thought agree that we interact with that world daily through our perception. The apparent naivety of one and contradiction of the other are large targets for skeptics of both theories. Perception is a tricky subject for philosophers. I find both of these theories comforting in the admittance of an external world that will continue to exist when my eyes close and open again.
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